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As has been reported to you previously, our aerial surveillance has shown that the ICRM and MRBM missile sites in Cuba, which we had identified, have been dismantled and fixed installations destroyed. Construction work has stopped on what were believed to be nuclear storage facilities.

By agreement with the Soviet Union we have been able to observe on the decks of freighters leaving Cuba the number of missiles on their transporters which the Soviet Union has said were in Cuba. This number corresponds closely to the number we would have expected to be there from other evidence available to us.

A considerable amount of the other equipment associated with the missile sites has been seen on docks by Soviet ships and has presumably been loaded and returned to the Soviet Union.

We had not identified any nuclear warheads for the missiles in Cuba. The Government of the USSR has informed us that there were such warheads in Cuba but that they were removed before the missiles left.

We have identified some 40 IL-28 light bombers in Cuba, most of them still in crates. Work on uncrating and assembling them has proceeded throughout the last several weeks. The Soviet Union has taken the position that they

DEPARTMENT OF STATE - IN/REGAL

REVIEWED BY JP/KW/ML DATE 3/7/83

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are not "offensive" weapons and were not covered by the exchange of letters between me and Chairman Khrushchev. They have also taken the position that these bombers have been turned over to the Cuban Government which is unwilling to have them returned to the Soviet Union or destroyed. It may be noted that the bombers have a range of some 740 miles and can carry nuclear bombs.

While agreement was reached between the US and the USSR and the Acting Secretary General of the UN with respect to the use of the ICRC to inspect incoming Soviet vessels for weapons in place of the OAS quarantine, the ICRC was unwilling to act in this capacity without the consent of the Cuban Government. The Cuban Government was unwilling to agree.

As noted we have continued our aerial surveillance of Cuba and have by this means verified that the missile bases have been dismantled and that the IL-28's have continued to be assembled. However, it has not been possible to arrange for inspection on the ground in Cuba of the sites or of other possible locations in which offensive weapons might be found. The efforts of the USSR and the Acting Secretary General of the UN to arrange for the UN verification by air and ground, which was essential in order to carry out the agreements reached by me with Chairman Khrushchev, have failed in the face of the refusal of the Cuban Govern-

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ment to permit such action. While we have no concrete evidence of such concealment, it is <sup>not</sup> possible for me to report that the agreement reached has been carried out or that there are no nuclear missiles remaining in Cuba. In addition we, of course, know that the IL-28's, with a nuclear capability, are still there.

For the same reasons-Cuban refusal to accept UN observers-it has not been possible to secure the safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons which was also part of my agreement with Chairman Khrushchev.

I am convinced that the Soviet Union, through the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Mikoyan, has made a sincere and vigorous effort, supporting that which had been made earlier by the Acting Secretary General of the UN, to secure the consent of the Cuban Government to these measures so necessary to the peace of this Hemisphere and to the confidence of all peoples that problems such as this one can be worked out and settled by negotiation rather than force. The Cuban Government is a free and independent government with very substantial military forces in its possession and in full control of what happens within Cuba. That Government must bear full responsibility for this failure <sup>the</sup> to achieve a distinct step forward in <sup>thus can</sup> ~~preserving~~ peace for the Hemisphere, <sup>in</sup> ~~and confidence among~~ nations.

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The United States and the other countries of this Hemisphere on October 23 unanimously declared that the provisions of the Rio Treaty of 1947 required that no more offensive weapons should reach Cuba and that those which might be there should never be capable of active use. IT authorized member countries to take whatever measures might be necessary, including the use of armed force, to achieve these ends. As of today they have not been achieved and we in the Hemisphere have an important piece of unfinished business before us.

The United States Government is calling for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to sit as an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty next week to determine what we should do to secure the necessary assurances that Cuba is not and will not become again a threat to the peace of this Hemisphere.

At that meeting the United States will propose that all countries break diplomatic relations with Cuba and cut off all trade and commercial contacts with Cuba.

The United States will also discuss with the Foreign Ministers the actions which can be taken to secure the maximum degree of assurance against the future development of the threat. These will include, but not necessarily be limited to, a means for ensuring that the IL-28's cannot operate against any of the countries of the Hemisphere and for maintaining close and constant surveillance of the

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entire territory of Cuba at low as well as high levels and of all ships coming to Cuba. Any attempt to interfere with this surveillance on the part of the Government of Cuba will be dealt with severely.

I am also sending a special representative to meet with the NATO Council to discuss what our NATO partners can do in securing compliance by the Cuban Government with the needs of our security.

In attempting to deal with this difficult situation the United States, as I am sure is true of the other countries of the Hemisphere, wishes, if at all possible, to avoid the losses of life and the human suffering that would be involved if it became necessary to use our overwhelming military power against little Cuba. Cuba is wholly dependent for its life and livelihood on imports from outside and we should much prefer to persuade the Cuban Government of the necessity for modifying its attitudes toward its neighbor countries through such peaceful means. But in a nuclear age, no country can be permitted to take advantage of its smallness to seek immunity from the requirements of its neighbors for freedom from the threat of nuclear attack. To follow this path would be surely to create a <sup>more</sup> chaotic world order than the one of peace and justice which is the objective of nearly all the world peoples today.

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I wish again to reiterate what I said in the closing paragraphs of my letter of October 23 about the desire of this country and of other Latin American countries to see the peoples of Cuba again free and again prospering. It is becoming increasingly clear that this prospect is impossible without a complete reversal in direction on the part of the Government of Cuba.

I want also to make clear that while we concentrate on the effort to carry out the agreement which the Cuban Government has flaunted with respect to offensive weapons, we are equally alert to the efforts of that Government to subvert other governments in the Hemisphere and equally determined to thwart its efforts in this regard.

I feel sure that if we pursue these tasks with the vigor and unity which we in this Hemisphere have shown to date in dealing with the situation created by the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, we shall succeed in accomplishing our purposes and soon.

ARA:EMMartin:lh 11/9/62

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